المدة الزمنية 2:14
CBI arrests three railway employees in Balasore train accident
تم نشره في 2023/07/07
DAYS after the tragic Balasore triple train accident, CBI arrested three railways officials on July 07. The central probe agency said that the accused have been arrested under sections 304, 201 of CrPC. The arrested railways employees have been identified as Arun Kumar Mahanta, senior section engineer; Amir Khan, section engineer; technician Pappu Kumar. CBI in its investigation found that the accused railway employees were also involved in the tampering of evidence. The arrested accused will be presented in the competent court and CBI will demand custody. The Railway Board had recommended a CBI probe into the accident following which on June 06. The CBI has already registered a First Information Report (FIR) in this matter. The horrific incident involving Coromandel Express, Shalimar Express and goods train claimed 291 lives and injured over 1000. #balasore #Balasoretrainaccident #odisha Subscribe now and press the bell icon 🔔 to get new video updates: https://bit.ly/2UV4ygi -------------------------------------- ANI is South Asia's leading Multimedia News Agency providing content for every information platform, including TV, Internet, broadband, newspapers, and mobiles. Subscribe now! Enjoy and stay connected with us!! ☛ Subscribe to ANI News YouTube channel: https://bit.ly/2UV4ygi ☛ Visit our Official website: https://www.aninews.in/ ☛ Follow ANI: https://twitter.com/ANI ☛ Like us: https://www.facebook.com/ANINEWS.IN ☛ Email to: anicontent@aniin.com, internetani@aniin.com ☛ Copyrights © All Rights Reserved ANI Media Pvt Ltd.
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مقاطع الفيديو ذات الصلة على CBI arrests three railway employees in Balasore train accident:
Why sit in power when you cant take any responsibility of mishap ? Poor leadership and management and just easily passing the buck. ... 3
(a) The Automatic Interlock System which is basically an operational safety device was compromised since 2018 !!!.
(b) The signalling system had lost its auto online status due to the manual fingering by the engineers. As per media, CRS reports suggests tampering of the signal system based on the statement of Mr Mohanta, Senior Sectional Engineer that immediately after the accident, he had rushed over to the control room to find the point signal still green although railway tracks had been ripped open with he point machine completely destroyed, suggesting dummy signal from external source,
(c) These sectional engineers and the technician from signal dept were an unsafe bunch, not fit for purpose , capable of only " jugaar" and as they lacked the knowledge and skill set to understand the inherent risk and the possible outcome of highly unprofessional behaviour.
(d) Since the same team members from the signal engineering department was responsible for the routine inspections and checks, planned . maintenance and major overhaul of all signalling equipment and systems , we can safely assume that signalling equipment was poorly maintained and safety procedures were bypassed thereby increasing the risk of equipment / system failure.
(e) It seems highly improbable that the Station Master and the Assistant Station Manager were completely ignorant of the fact that their technical support teams could tamper around with signalling system and able to hide blotched up repairs . Its very evident that they regularly ignored tell tale signs and red alerts and did not themselves comply to standard operating procedures. Its obvious that they were not monitoring the repair & maintenance being undertaken within their jurisdiction as procedure requires them to witness the final testing & commissioning to their satisfaction prior signing the re-connection memo therefore either they were privy to these blotched repairs or contrary to standard procedures they personally never attended which complemented the unsafe practices being undertaken.
(f) There was another major incident involving collision of two goods train causing derailment of 12 bogies at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district on the 25th June 2023 which seems to have been deliberately kept low key by the local government and Indian Railways and although its been nearly three weeks since the incident there has been nil feedback from the Indian Railways on status of a CRS investigation . This sequence of events that which lead to a goods train to overrun red point signal and collide with a stationary goods train parked on the loop line causing derailment of twelve coaches resulting in severe damage to property. A passenger train in place of the moving good train would led to several fatalities and the railways should consider themselves very lucky since there were no fatalities. However, we cannot allow any attempt to keep this incident away from the limelight especially when sequence of events that leading to the collision was very similar to the collision of Coromandel Express with stationary goods train parked in the loop line therefore imperative that the root cause of this incident is investigated , as the alarming frequency at which these major incidents are occurring suggest deep rooted and systemic non-compliance of the Safety Management System therefore the need for CBI to carry out a joint investigation of both these major incidents . Believe that the arrest of the two signal engineers and one technician and the suspension of another four railway personnel are just the tip of the iceberg .as reckon we may be looking at a systemic failure of he quality management and safety management systems ... 4
We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issue of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine.
The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point. ... 4
Why sit in power when you cant take any responsibility of mishap ? Poor leadership and management and just easily passing the buck. ... 3
(a) The Automatic Interlock System which is basically an operational safety device was compromised since 2018 !!!.
(b) The signalling system had lost its auto online status due to the manual fingering by the engineers. As per media, CRS reports suggests tampering of the signal system based on the statement of Mr Mohanta, Senior Sectional Engineer that immediately after the accident, he had rushed over to the control room to find the point signal still green although railway tracks had been ripped open with he point machine completely destroyed, suggesting dummy signal from external source,
(c) These sectional engineers and the technician from signal dept were an unsafe bunch, not fit for purpose , capable of only " jugaar" and as they lacked the knowledge and skill set to understand the inherent risk and the possible outcome of highly unprofessional behaviour.
(d) Since the same team members from the signal engineering department was responsible for the routine inspections and checks, planned . maintenance and major overhaul of all signalling equipment and systems , we can safely assume that signalling equipment was poorly maintained and safety procedures were bypassed thereby increasing the risk of equipment / system failure.
(e) It seems highly improbable that the Station Master and the Assistant Station Manager were completely ignorant of the fact that their technical support teams could tamper around with signalling system and able to hide blotched up repairs . Its very evident that they regularly ignored tell tale signs and red alerts and did not themselves comply to standard operating procedures. Its obvious that they were not monitoring the repair & maintenance being undertaken within their jurisdiction as procedure requires them to witness the final testing & commissioning to their satisfaction prior signing the re-connection memo therefore either they were privy to these blotched repairs or contrary to standard procedures they personally never attended which complemented the unsafe practices being undertaken.
(f) There was another major incident involving collision of two goods train causing derailment of 12 bogies at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district on the 25th June 2023 which seems to have been deliberately kept low key by the local government and Indian Railways and although its been nearly three weeks since the incident there has been nil feedback from the Indian Railways on status of a CRS investigation . This sequence of events that which lead to a goods train to overrun red point signal and collide with a stationary goods train parked on the loop line causing derailment of twelve coaches resulting in severe damage to property. A passenger train in place of the moving good train would led to several fatalities and the railways should consider themselves very lucky since there were no fatalities. However, we cannot allow any attempt to keep this incident away from the limelight especially when sequence of events that leading to the collision was very similar to the collision of Coromandel Express with stationary goods train parked in the loop line therefore imperative that the root cause of this incident is investigated , as the alarming frequency at which these major incidents are occurring suggest deep rooted and systemic non-compliance of the Safety Management System therefore the need for CBI to carry out a joint investigation of both these major incidents . Believe that the arrest of the two signal engineers and one technician and the suspension of another four railway personnel are just the tip of the iceberg .as reckon we may be looking at a systemic failure of he quality management and safety management systems ... 4
We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issue of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine.
The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point. ... 4